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1

Although thought of by some as simply a patent law court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit actually has been given sole
responsibility, at the court of appeals level, for numerous other areas
2
of law. They include: (1) all government contract disputes, whether
3
for goods and services, civilian and military small or large; (2) all
international trade cases, which comprise anti-dumping duties,
counter-vailing duties to offset foreign government subsidization of
4
exporting companies and customs tariffs on imports; (3) veterans’
5
benefits claims; (4) government personnel adverse actions, including
6
those brought by alleged whistleblowers; (5) appeals from the
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. See 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(1), (4) (2006) (setting forth Federal Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction over all appeals from U.S. district court patent decisions and over patent
and trademark appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
3. Id. § 1295(a)(3), (10).
4. Id. § 1295 (a)(5), (7).
5. 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2006).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(9).
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International Trade Commission’s import exclusion orders, which
concern products made elsewhere that if were made here would
7
infringe a United States patent; (6) just compensation cases under
the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
often involving the adverse effects on property owners due to
8
9
government regulations; (7) tax refund cases; (8) childhood vaccine
10
injury cases, which concern medical causation issues; (9) back-pay
cases involving both civilian government employees and military
11
officers denied required promotions; and (10) all other appeals
12
from final decisions of the Court of Federal Claims. In addition to
13
14
cases involving the patent and plant variety protection laws of the
United States, the court also hears appeals from the ninety-four U.S.
district courts involving money claims against the Federal
15
government not exceeding $10,000. Other tribunals reviewed by
the court include, in addition to the Court of Federal Claims, the
U.S. Court of International Trade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Civilian
Board of Contract Appeals, the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, the Congressional Office of Compliances, the patent and
trademark appeals boards of the Patent and Trademark Office, as
well as several other tribunals. In all, the court reviews decisions of
over 100 courts and other tribunals as well as certain rulings of the
16
17
Secretary of Veterans Affairs and certain other cabinet officers.
A large majority of the court’s appeals concern administrative
agency actions, so the court could be considered an administrative
law court more than a patent court particularly since patent cases are
18
only about one-third of our docket. Until recently, personnel and
7. Id. § 1295(a)(6).
8. Id. §§ 1295(a)(3), 1491(a)(1).
9. Id. § 1295(a)(2).
10. Id. § 1295(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (2006).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(3), 1491(a)(1).
12. Id. § 1295(a)(3).
13. Id. § 1295(a)(1), (3) (setting forth the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction
over all appeals from U.S. district court patent decisions).
14. Id. § 1295(a)(8) (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all
appeals under section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006)).
15. Id. § 1295(a)(2).
16. 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1295(b), (c) (authorizing appeals brought by the head of
any executive department or agency from Board of Contract Appeals’ final decisions
where the agency head decides the decision is not entitled to finality under the
standards promulgated in 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (2006)); id. § 1296(a)(3) (authorizing
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over appeals brought by the Secretary of Labor
under “part C of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 3”).
18. See, e.g., FY 2008 Appeals Filed to the Federal Circuit By Category,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/ChartFilings08.pdf (last visited March 23, 2009)
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veterans filings each outnumbered our intellectual property cases.
Now, pending patent cases outnumber all other areas, not because
they have increased but because veterans and personal filings have
decreased.
With such diverse areas of responsibility, it should be no surprise
that the majority of our twelve active judges (and all four senior
judges) are not lifetime patent lawyers, although one-third are; it is
just in proportion to our patent portion of the entire docket. The
rest of the judges have extremely varied backgrounds. In addition to
20
high-level Department of Justice officials, the court has several
21
general civil litigators from private practice, two former professors of
22
23
law, a tax lawyer, and three former staff leaders from the
24
U.S. Senate.
With so diverse a caseload and so diverse of complement of judges,
it is not immediately apparent what is the unifying theme of the
court’s many subject areas of jurisdiction. But the Federal Court

(graphically displaying the relative percentages of appeals for each of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdictional areas).
19. Compare id. (listing the Federal Circuit’s FY2008 appeals by category, where
intellectual property appeals constituted thirty-three percent of the court’s case load
and personnel (twenty-nine percent) and veterans appeals (twelve percent)
constituted forty-one percent of the court’s case load), with FY 2007 Appeals Filed to
the
Federal
Circuit
By
Category,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/
ChartFilings07.pdf (last visited March 1, 2009) (listing the Federal Circuit’s FY2007
appeals by category, where intellectual property appeals constituted twenty-nine
percent of the court’s case load and personnel (twenty-six percent) and veterans
appeals (twenty-one percent) constituted forty-seven percent of the court’s case
load), and FY 2006 Appeals Filed to the Federal Circuit By Category,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/ChartFilings06.pdf (last visited March 1, 2009)
(listing the Federal Circuit’s FY2006 appeals by category, where intellectual property
appeals constituted thirty-one percent of the court’s case load and personnel (twentynine percent) and veterans appeals (twenty-two percent) constituted fifty-one
percent of the court’s case load).
20. See, e.g., Federal Circuit: Judicial Biographies, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
judgbios.html (last visited March 23, 2009) (noting that Chief Judge Michel, Senior
Judge Friedman, Senior Judge Archer, Judge Schall, and Judge Bryson had served in
the Department of Justice prior to their appointment to the Federal Circuit).
21. See, e.g., id. (noting that Senior Judge Archer, Judge Mayer, Senior Judge
Clevenger, Judge Schall, Judge Bryson, Judge Gajarsa, Judge Linn, Judge Dyk, and
Judge Moore have had experiences in private practice prior to their appointment to
the Federal Circuit).
22. See, e.g., id. (indicating that Judge Plager and Judge Moore served as full-time
law professors and that a number of other judges served as adjunct professors prior
to their appointment to the Federal Circuit).
23. See, e.g., id. (indicating that Senior Judge Archer was a prominent tax attorney
and as Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, prior to his appointment to the
Federal Circuit).
24. See, e.g., id. (noting that Chief Judge Michel, Judge Rader, and Judge Prost
held positions as staff leaders in the Senate prior to their appointment to the Federal
Circuit).
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25

Improvements Act of 1982, which created the court, makes clear in
its text and even more so in its legislative history that Congress
selected all those areas for which it placed a premium on the need
26
for national uniformity. Thus, cases once heard in twelve regional
courts of appeals were removed and concentrated in a single circuit
court, called the Federal Circuit, and housed in what, pursuant to
later legislation, is now called the Howard T. Markey National Courts
27
Building in honor of our court’s first chief judge. It is the only
court of appeals whose jurisdiction is based on subject-matter rather
than geography. It is thus, at least so far, the only exception to the
regional organization of federal courts of appeals which had its
28
Tax, social security, and
genesis in the Evarts Act of 1891.
environment cases were among additional areas of subject matter
jurisdiction considered by, but in the end not adopted by, the
29
Congress.
In the legislative history, Congress prohibited specialization among
30
Although locating the
the judges of this semi-specialized court.
court in the nation’s capital of Washington, D.C., and requiring its
31
judges to reside within 50 miles of the city, Congress also authorized
and expected the court to sit from time to time in the other major
32
cities, those in which any other circuit court may sit. This the court
has done throughout its history, sitting once or twice a year for over a
decade in other cities all around the nation as befits a “national”
court of appeals. In addition, many of our judges regularly sit by
designation of the Chief Justice of the United States with other circuit
courts. I myself sat last October with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
33
the Third Circuit.

25. Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in various parts of
18 U.S.C.).
26. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981) (stating that two purposes of the
legislation are “to fill a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum
capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where
Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity” and “to
improve the administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent
cases”). See generally S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735 (2007).
27. Pub. L. 105-179, 112 Stat 510 (1998).
28. 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
29. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 40 (1981) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (expressing
concern over recent proposals to create such specialty courts).
30. See id. at 6 .
31. 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2006).
32. Id. § 48.
33. See, e.g., Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that the Joint Statement of the Berlin Accords did not confer a private
cause of action to enforce an interest provision within the Joint Statement).
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From this brief explanation of origins and purpose, it should be
clear that maximizing consistency and clarity of the rules derived
from precedential holdings is more important for the Federal Circuit
than for the other courts of appeals. What then does the court do to
address this overarching goal? Essentially three things. First, in
addition to avoiding specialization among our judges regarding the
various and diverse “niche” jurisdictions, the court’s calendaring
system relies on a randomized creation of panel membership, and
each argument day in our monthly argument week features a new,
randomly-drawn panel. Panel judges, being quite aware of the
congressional mandate of uniformity and consistency, work hard to
suggest clarifying changes to the assigned author’s draft opinion for
the panel. Second, after the panel members have revised their
opinion and agreed on its wording, it is circulated for eight working
days (more in the summer months) to all other active and senior
judges of the court, plus any visiting judge of whom we typically have
34
had at least one per argument week for the past two and half years.
Often the non-panel judges suggest further improvements and
clarifications. Third, the semi-permanent staff attorneys of our
court’s Central Legal Office, during the same eight-day review period,
compare the language on each issue with corresponding language in
past precedents to identify unintended sources of conflict or
confusion. All judges receive the Office’s analysis, and often further
refinements result.
Lastly, like all courts of appeals, we consider rehearing panel
decisions en banc, both sua sponte and pursuant to petitions filed by
the losing appellate party. In either mode, rehearing requires an
affirmative vote of at least seven of the twelve active judges. The vote
occurs only if a poll of all such judges is requested by any one of
them. When the Chief Judge receives such a request, usually
supported by an accompanying memorandum, a poll must promptly
be circulated. Unlike many other matters brought to the Chief
Judge, on this one the Chief’s actions involve no discretion, but are
purely ministerial. Standards for voting on polls are set forth in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, suggesting en banc
consideration is appropriate when “necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of the court’s decision; or the proceeding involves a
35
question of exceptional importance.” The Rule advises that en banc

34. See, e.g., List of Federal Circuit’s Visiting Judges, http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/pdf/Visiting_Judges.pdf (last visited February 28, 2009).
35. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
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hearing of appeals is disfavored and will be granted only sparingly.
In accordance with this approach, we say informally among ourselves
that mere disagreement with the panel’s result or even its rationale
37
ordinarily will not justify en banc rehearing. Even inconsistent dicta
will not. But a truly inconsistent or conflicting holding will. That is,
we compare the holdings of one or more decisions, usually
comparing a panel opinion with a panel opinion issued earlier.
Although many forget this, the settled rule is that an earlier panel
decision controls and therefore the holding in the later case must
38
As one might expect, the result is that en banc
conform.
39
consideration is granted only five times or less per year. The court
routinely receives about 100 petitions per year for panel and en banc
40
rehearings, about half in patent infringement cases.
And, the
number filed has risen significantly in recent years.
Why are en banc cases so rare? Well, perhaps nearly all alleged
conflicts of holding are actually no more than conflicts of dicta. But
there are other reasons as well. For one thing, en bancs are
extremely inefficient, often requiring as much as ten times the work
hours of each judge as the same case required of a member of a
three-judge panel. Such cases may also increase friction among the
judges, impairing the collegiality so important to an appellate court.
Not surprisingly then, a petition for en banc rehearing that results
in a poll (and very few do) often secures as many as three or four
votes, but not more. Since it generally takes seven votes, a number of
appeals each year “almost” go en banc but do not. The sixth and
seventh votes are usually difficult to find. Some of our active judges
think the court goes en banc too often, some too seldom. My own
view is that numbers or percentages of grants do not tell a useful
story. The question is not how many cases per year are reheard en
banc, but whether those requiring such treatment are. It is, of
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1043
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Lourie, J.) (concurring in decision not to rehear case en banc
“even though [he] agree[d] that the panel erred in construing the claim limitation”
at issue).
38. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Where
there is direct conflict” between two Federal Circuit panel decisions, “the
precedential decision is the first.”).
39. See, e.g., Chart of Federal Circuit’s Decisions Regarding Petitions for
Rehearing,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/PetitionsforRehearingFiledand
Granted99-08.pdf (last visited March 23, 2009) (examining the Federal Circuit’s
decisions on en banc and panel rehearing petitions).
40. For data regarding the number and types of appeals in the Federal Circuit
from 1999 to 2008, see http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/March5thInn
presentation.pdf.
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course, a matter of sophisticated judgment. In addition, individual
judges may have different concerns. For example, for one judge the
risk of numerous separate dissents or concurrences may seem to
make the law less, rather than more, consistent and clear. Another
may feel the issue will someday require clarification or outright
41
correction, but the particular case seems not the best vehicle.
Sometimes judges feel more development of the issue by panels is
useful and therefore the en banc consideration is better left to
another day, another case.
In addition, judges are, too a great degree, dependent on the
quality of the petitions written by advocates. Often, these petitions
merely allege rather than demonstrate a true conflict in holdings.
Often they fail to carefully analyze Supreme Court precedents and
how doctrines have evolved. Usually, broad dicta is all that is cited to
support full court rehearing. Among ourselves we derisively refer to
such quotes of snippets of language as “cite bites.” They are seldom
helpful. Advocates, however, complain that the filing deadlines for
both parties and potential amici (respectively, fourteen and seven
42
days, until recently ) are too short for quality filings. Therefore, the
43
court has enlarged these deadlines, roughly doubling each. Time
alone will tell whether the result will be better, in-depth advocacy.
The amici filings can be merely repetitive of the party’s and thus
useless. Or, it can be extremely fresh and, therefore, potentially of
great value.
Amicus participation on the merits of cases reheard en banc has
grown greatly in recent years. The court’s most recent en banc case,
44
In re Bilski, included some thirty-six amicus briefs. Many were high
quality, and in my own view credible, candid, and convincing. Once
a case is voted to be heard or reheard en banc, the court reliably
receives ample amicus participation. But amicus briefs before panels,
even in obviously landmark cases, are rather rare. Perhaps most
needed, in my opinion, is more amicus help on the threshold
question of whether to go en banc in the first place. In several recent

41. See Amgen, Inc., 469 F.3d at 1045 (Garjarsa, Linn, & Dyk, JJ.) (concurring in
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc but noting that “[i]n an appropriate
case [they] would be willing to reconsider limited aspects of the Cybor decision”).
42. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(e), 35(c), 40(a).
43. See FED. CIR. R. 35 (petition for rehearing en banc); FED. CIR. R. 40 (petition
for panel rehearing).
44. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W.
3442 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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speeches, I have encouraged greater attention to this opportunity.
My own belief is that while the court is a trustee of the areas
responsibility granted by Congress, the court’s bar (really a dozen
specialty bars) has a major role indeed, and a responsibility, as well.
The Law Review’s annual Federal Circuit volume is of interest to
our court and our bars as well as to the academic community and the
student staff. Maximizing consistency must be a community-wide
project. Therefore, I thank the Law Review for the opportunity to
explain our processes and unmet needs and to seek still more input
from the entire community, especially to help identify which appeals
truly justify and warrant en banc consideration.

45. See, e.g., Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Address to the Program on Information
Justice and Intellectual Property at the Washington College of Law: Patentable
Subject Matter After the Bilski Decision, Jan. 26, 2009,
https://fedcirbar.webex.com/mw0305l/mywebex/default.do?siteurl=fedcirbar.

